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Abstract: Newly discovered true (non-null) associations often have
inﬂated effects compared with the true effect sizes. I discuss here the
main reasons for this inﬂation. First, theoretical considerations prove
that when true discovery is claimed based on crossing a threshold of
statistical signiﬁcance and the discovery study is underpowered, the
observed effects are expected to be inﬂated. This has been demon-
strated in various ﬁelds ranging from early stopped clinical trials to
genome-wide associations. Second, ﬂexible analyses coupled with
selective reporting may inﬂate the published discovered effects. The
vibration ratio (the ratio of the largest vs. smallest effect on the same
association approached with different analytic choices) can be very
large. Third, effects may be inﬂated at the stage of interpretation due
to diverse conﬂicts of interest. Discovered effects are not always
inﬂated, and under some circumstances may be deﬂated—for exam-
ple, in the setting of late discovery of associations in sequentially
accumulated overpowered evidence, in some types of misclassiﬁca-
tion from measurement error, and in conﬂicts causing reverse biases.
Finally, I discuss potential approaches to this problem. These in-
clude being cautious about newly discovered effect sizes, consider-
ing some rational down-adjustment, using analytical methods that
correct for the anticipated inﬂation, ignoring the magnitude of the
effect (if not necessary), conducting large studies in the discovery
phase, using strict protocols for analyses, pursuing complete and
transparent reporting of all results, placing emphasis on replication,
and being fair with interpretation of results.
(Epidemiology 2008;19: 640–648)
T
he discovery and replication of associations is a core
activity of quantitative research. This article will not deal
with the debate on whether research ﬁndings are credible.
1 I
will focus instead on the interesting subset of research ﬁnd-
ings that are true. Research ﬁndings discussed here encom-
pass all types of associations that emerge from quantitative
measurements, and are expressed as effect metrics. This
includes treatment effects from clinical trials, measures of
risk for observational risk factors, prognostic effects for
prognostic studies, and so forth. I start here with the assump-
tion that a research ﬁnding is indeed true (non-null), ie, it
reﬂects a genuine association that is not entirely due to
chance or biases (confounding, misclassiﬁcation, selection
biases, selective reporting, or other). The question is: do the
effect sizes for such associations, at the time they are ﬁrst
discovered and published in the scientiﬁc literature, accu-
rately reﬂect the true effect sizes?
The article has the following sections: a brief literature
review on inﬂated early-effect sizes based on theoretical and
empirical considerations; a description of the major reasons
why early discovered effects are inﬂated and the major
countering forces that may occasionally lead to deﬂated
effects (underestimates); and suggestions on how to deal with
these problems.
Evidence About Inflated Early-Effect Sizes
Table 1 cites articles suggesting that early studies give
(on average) inﬂated estimates of effect.
2–34 I list here only
selected evaluations that cover either many different articles/
effects or a whole research domain or method. This list is
nowhere close to exhaustive. For some topics, such as the
inﬂation of regression coefﬁcients for variables selected through
stepwise statistical-signiﬁcance-based processes, the literature is
vast. The theme of inﬂated early effects has been encountered
in various disguises in many scientiﬁc disciplines in the
biomedical sciences and beyond. For empirical studies, it
may not be known whether the subsequent studies are more
correct than the original discovery, but when a pattern is seen
repeatedly in a ﬁeld, the association is probably real, even if
its exact extent can be debated. One should also acknowledge
the difﬁculty in differentiating between an early inﬂated but
true (non-null) effect and an entirely false (null) one. In
addition to empirical studies, however, Table 1 also includes
theoretical work that proves why inﬂation is anticipated;
some of these arguments are discussed in the next section.
I mention here a few examples to demonstrate the
seriousness of the problem. The prognostic signiﬁcance of a
70-gene expression signature for lymph-node-negative breast
cancer is accepted beyond doubt.
35 However, while the ﬁrst
study published in Nature showed almost perfect sensitivity
and speciﬁcity, even in an independent replication exercise of
19 patients,
36 subsequent evaluation in a cohort of 307
women showed sensitivity of 90% and speciﬁcity of only
40% (AUC for survival 0.648).
37 Prognostic ability is
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tor and a modest-to-poor predictor is prominent.
35
Many high-proﬁle clinical trials are stopped early during
their conduct. This is performed according to robust rules that
suggest termination when a demanding threshold of statistical
signiﬁcance is crossed during an interim analysis.
3,4 These
interventions are indeed effective (the null of “no effectiveness”
is correctly rejected). However, as shown both in theory
3,4 and
in practice,
5 the effect sizes derived from such early terminated
trials are inﬂated. With very early termination, the effect sizes
may be markedly inﬂated,
5 with implications for decision-
making in the use of these interventions.
Theoretical considerations prove that linkage signals of
genome-wide linkage studies are inﬂated.
12–15 These studies
have aimed to reveal loci that harbor genetic variants that are
related to various phenotypes. Several thousands of such studies
conducted over 2 decades have yielded very few replicated hits.
Although the replication record is better with genome-wide
association studies, theoretical considerations again show the
early discovered effects are inﬂated.
23,24 Furthermore, if the
observed effects are used as estimates in designing replication
studies, these subsequent studies will be underpowered, and
genuine effects will be falsely nonreplicated.
38
Inflated Effect Sizes Due to Selection
Thresholds and Suboptimal Power
Effect sizes of newly discovered true (non-null) asso-
ciations are inherently inﬂated on average. This is due to the
key characteristic of the discovery process. Inﬂation is ex-
pected when, to claim success (discovery), an association has
to pass a certain threshold of statistical signiﬁcance, and the
study that leads to the discovery has suboptimal power to
make the discovery at the requested threshold of statistical
signiﬁcance. Both conditions are necessary to inﬂate effect
sizes. If investigators were not ﬁxated on claiming discover-
ies based on P value thresholds, this would not be an issue.
Similarly if the discovery studies were fully powered, inﬂa-
tion would not be an issue. Selection usually entails P values,
but a similar pattern may be seen if selection is based on
effect size or some other threshold measure.
For illustrative purposes, I use here a simulation ap-
proach to demonstrate this phenomenon and the relationship
between inﬂation and lack of power. Suppose that the true
odds ratio (OR) for an association is 1.10 or 1.25 and that the
proportion of exposed individuals in the control group is
30%. We can simulate a set of studies that have an equal
number of participants (n) in each of the 2 compared groups.
The number of exposed in the control group in each simulated
study is drawn randomly from a binomial distribution with
probability 0.30. The number of exposed in the case group in
each simulated study is drawn randomly from a binomial
distribution with probability 0.3203 or 0.3488, so as to
correspond to OR  1.10 and 1.25, respectively. The median
OR of these simulated studies is expected to be 1.10 or 1.25,
respectively. However, this is not so when we focus only on
TABLE 1. Selected Evaluations Suggesting That Early Discovered Effects Are Inflated
Research Field Theoretical Work or Empirical Evidence and References
Highly cited clinical research A quarter of most-cited clinical trials and 5/6 most-cited epidemiological studies were either fully
contradicted or found to have exaggerated results
2
Early stopped clinical trials Early stopping results in inﬂated effects in theory
3,4 and shown also in practice
5
Clinical trials of mental health interventions More likely for effect sizes of pharmacotherapies to diminish than to increase over time
6
Clinical trials on heart failure interventions “Regression to the truth” in phase III trials for interventions with early promising results
7
Clinical trials on diverse interventions Effectiveness shown to fade over time
8
Multiple meta-analyses on effectiveness Eleven independent meta-analyses on acetylcysteine show decreasing effects over time
9
Epidemiologic associations Expected to be inﬂated in multiple testing with signiﬁcance threshold; empirical demonstration for
occupational carcinogens
10
Pharmacoepidemiology “Phantom ship” associations that do not stand upon further evaluation
11
Gene-disease associations Several empirical evaluations showing dissipation of effect sizes over time
12–15
Linkage studies in humans Theory anticipates large upward bias (“winner’s curse”) in effects of discovered loci
16–18
Genetic traits in experimental crosses As above (actually literature on the “Beavis effect” precedes literature on humans)
19–22
Genome-wide associations Large winner’s curse anticipated for discovered effects in underpowered conditions
23,24
Ecology and evolution Empirical demonstration that relationships fade over time
25,26
Psychology Replication studies in psychology failing to conﬁrm true effects because the new studies were
underpowered due to reliance on the estimate of effect from the original positive study
27
Early repeated data peaking in general Simulations to model inﬂation of effects with repeated data peaking
28
Prognostic models Overestimated prognostic performance with stepwise selection of variables based on signiﬁcance
thresholds
29–32
Regression models in general Exaggerated effects (coefﬁcients) with stepwise selection based on signiﬁcance thresholds and small
datasets
32–34; may correct substantially if a very lenient alpha  0.20 is used for selection
34 thus
having enough power
Epidemiology • Volume 19, Number 5, September 2008 Why Most Discovered True Associations Are Inflated
© 2008 Lippincott Williams & Wilkins 641the simulated studies that have a P value for the association
crossing a speciﬁc level of statistical signiﬁcance. Table 2
shows the median and IQR of the ORs that cross the “P value 
0.05” threshold of statistical signiﬁcance for different values
of n. As shown, even though the true OR is 1.10, the median
observed OR when a study discovers this association (P 
0.05) is 1.51 when n  250 (a study of 500 participants total).
With similar sample sizes, when the true OR  1.25, the
discovered median OR is 1.60. When the studies have n  50
(100 participants total), the median discovered OR is 2.73
instead of 1.25, representing huge inﬂation. One should note also
the skewed nature of the distributions of discovered effects.
One may argue that we do not know the true effect sizes
necessary to make these simulations for speciﬁc hypotheses.
In the example above, if the true OR were 500, then studies
with 250 participants per group would have excellent power
to detect it at   0.05 and the discovered effects would not
be inﬂated compared with the true OR  500. In some ﬁelds,
there may be considerable uncertainty about the magnitude of
the true effect sizes. However, in most ﬁelds, we can make
reasonable guesses about the effect sizes, with only modest
uncertainty. For example, in genetic associations of common
variants with common diseases, we have repeatedly found
that effect sizes of consistently and extensively replicated
associations tend to be small or even very small (most ORs 
1.1–1.4; a few, 1.4–2).
39–41 Similarly, for most medical
interventions with hard clinical outcomes (including mortal-
ity) relative risk decreases of 10%–30% are the best we can
hope for. Some ﬁelds that have proposed much larger effect
sizes may simply need a reality check. Perhaps some of these
ﬁelds have been stuck in doing underpowered studies, and
thus effects circulating in their literature appear large when
they are actually much smaller.
Inflated Effects Due to Flexible Analyses
(Vibration of Effects) and Selective Reporting
Until now, we have assumed that the (simulated) stud-
ies arise out of the play of chance alone. We have assumed
that there is no human intervention in the analysis process and
there is only one analysis based on the observed results. This
situation is rare in discovery research. The hallmark of
discovery is the performance of exploratory analyses. Flexi-
ble analyses lead to vibration of effects. Vibration conveys
the extent to which an effect may change in alternative
analytical approaches.
Vibration is mostly due to the availability of alternative
options in statistical model selection (eg, Cox model for
time-to-death vs. logistic regression for death in 30 days);
statistical inference machine (eg, different methods for com-
putation of the odds ratio eg, with or without Wolf correction
and with different corrections of zero cells and its vari-
ance
42); data selection (eg, possibility to exclude or include
some participants based on some partly prespeciﬁed, pre-
speciﬁed but ambivalent, or entirely post hoc criteria); de-
pendent arbitration of equivocal data; and wide choice of
adjustments for other covariates (especially when there are
many such). Changes may affect not only the analytic core
but also the question formulation itself, eg, changing eligi-
bility criteria may modify the research question.
I deﬁne the vibration ratio for effect size as the ratio
between the extremes of effect sizes that can be obtained
in the same study under different analytical options. In
Figure 1, I have analyzed the same dataset (250 participants)
with different approaches. Unadjusted analysis yields OR 
2.10 (95% conﬁdence interval CI1.18–3.72). I simulate
2 random variables and also perform analyses adjusting the
association for each one of them. The vibration ratio is only
1.01. I simulate another random variable and perform analy-
ses where the top 6% or the top 10% of the participants for
this random variable are considered noneligible for the anal-
ysis. The vibration ratio is 1.18. Then, I also simulate 5
observations (only 2% of the data) for which exposure is
considered equivocal, and is either changed to speciﬁcally
agree with the direction of the association or is changed to
speciﬁcally disagree with the direction of the association. The
vibration ratio is 1.55. The possible combinations of random
adjustment, random eligibility, and dependent arbitration, as
above, yield a vibration ratio of 1.95: ORs as divergent as
1.48 (CI 0.81–2.70) and 2.88 (1.55–5.35) are obtained with
these relatively subtle options. Without trying hard, I changed
the OR 2-fold.
The vibration ratio will be larger in small datasets and
in those with hazy deﬁnitions of variables, unclear eligibility
criteria, large numbers of covariates, and no consensus in the
ﬁeld about what analysis should be the default. In most discov-
ery research, this explosive mix is the rule. It is difﬁcult to obtain
funding to run very large studies for taking a ﬁrst shot into the
dark, and discovery is inherently related to situations where hazy
deﬁnitions and iterative searching abound. The wealth of data-
bases in covariates has also grown over time.
Even if enormous, vibration alone would not lead to
inﬂated discovered effects if one eventually presents all the
TABLE 2. Simulations for Effect Sizes Passing the Threshold
of Formal Statistical Significance (P  0.05)
True
OR
Control Group
Rate (%)
Sample n
Per Group
Observed OR in Signiﬁcant
Associations
Median (IQR)
Median Fold
Inﬂation
1.10 30 1000 1.23 (1.23–1.29) 1.11
1.10 30 250 1.51 (1.49–1.55) 1.37
1.25 30 1000 1.29 (1.26–1.39) 1.03
1.25 30 250 1.60 (1.50–1.67) 1.28
1.25 30 50 2.73 (2.60–3.16) 2.18
IQR indicates interquartile range.
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typically only one or a few analyses are presented. Moreover,
vibration would not be a problem if the one or few analyses
selected for presentation were a random choice of the possi-
ble ones, selected with an impartial view and no interest in
making a discovery. However, this is counterintuitive to the
discovery process. One makes exploratory analyses speciﬁ-
cally to ﬁnd something. The effects selected for presentation
are likely to be among the largest observed, if not the largest
possible. Secondary analyses similarly may be chosen to
show that they are consistent with the main selected analysis.
Selective analyses and outcome reporting have been
extensively demonstrated in clinical-trials research compar-
ing protocols against reported results.
43–45 In theory, random-
ized trials have more inﬂexible protocols compared with
observational epidemiology and fully exploratory research.
For observational research, similar evaluations are more dif-
ﬁcult to conduct because protocols are not readily available—
often there is no protocol at all. Empirical evidence has
demonstrated across a large sample of 379 epidemiologic
studies that investigators selected the contrasts for contin-
uous variables so as to show effects as being larger: more
extreme contrasts were presented, when effects were in-
herently smaller.
46
Post hoc demonstration of selective analysis and out-
come reporting is difﬁcult. Recently, a test was proposed to
examine whether the number of reported study results that
pass certain levels of statistical signiﬁcance is reasonable or
larger than what one would expect, even if the effect sizes for
the proposed associations (eg, as suggested by meta-analyses
of all relevant studies) were true.
47 Testing has suggested
substantial selective reporting biases in both clinical trials and
observational epidemiology.
12,47–49
Inflated Interpretation for Effect Sizes
Inﬂated interpretation is the toughest of all sources of
inﬂation to tackle. In a culture that rewards discovery, inves-
tigators may make an extra effort to present results in the
most favorable way. This goes beyond selective reporting and
enters the realm of qualitative interpretation of quantitative
effects. Typical variants of inﬂated interpretation include unwar-
ranted extrapolations and over-stated generalizability,
50 silenc-
ing or downplaying limitations and caveats,
51 mishandling
external evidence,
52,53 and extension of promises to different
inferential levels. In the last category, some typical leaps of
faith in the epidemiologic literature include the interpretation
of association as causation, the interpretation of association
or even causation as anticipated treatment effects, and the
interpretation of optimal efﬁcacy as effectiveness in every-
day life and clinical practice. In the molecular literature, a
typical leap of faith is the interpretation that a modest asso-
ciation pointing to a new biologic pathway can be translated
into a major beneﬁt for treatment of diseases that may
somehow be involved in this pathway. The sparse successful
clinical translation of major promises made in the most
high-proﬁle basic science journals shows that this over-
interpretation is common.
54
Why Published True Associations May
Sometimes Have Deflated Effects
Contrary to the above, some discovered associations
may have deﬂated effect sizes compared with the true ones.
For example, this may occur with overpowered studies,
where interim looks at the data are performed at early stages
and discovery happens late. If the association does not cross
the desired threshold of signiﬁcance at the interim looks, but
only at the very end, the effect may be deﬂated, although the
deﬂation is typically small.
3,4 The same situation would arise
if the discovery process occurs as a regularly updated pro-
spective meta-analysis, a true association gets discovered
FIGURE 1. Vibration of an effect size: the odds ratio with 95%
confidence interval is obtained for a simulated study, with or
without adjustment (A0 indicates no adjustment; A1, adjust-
ment for one randomly generated variable; A2, adjustment for
another randomly generated variable), application of various
eligibility criteria (E0 indicates all participants included; E1,
excluding 6% of the participants according to high values on
a random variable; E2, excluding 10% of the participants
according to high values on a random variable) and arbitration
of 2% of the data on the exposure based on knowledge of
outcome (D0 indicates no arbitration; D1, 2% of the exposure
data 5 observations changed to be consistent with the direc-
tion of the association; D2, 2% of the exposure data 5
observations changed to be against the direction of the pos-
tulated association).
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many studies have been performed and combined in the
meta-analysis, and the power of these combined studies is
high to detect such as association. Nevertheless, in most
ﬁelds, overpowered studies at the discovery phase are still a
small minority compared with underpowered studies
55–60;
moreover, the paradigm of prospective cumulative meta-analy-
sis as a discovery tool has not been widely disseminated.
Another reason for deﬂated effect sizes is independent
nondifferential misclassiﬁcation due to measurement error in
the associated variables. There is an extensive literature on
misclassiﬁcation and how to correct effect sizes for misclas-
siﬁcation.
61 However, such corrections have never become
main stream. Perhaps this is because usually nonindependent
and differential misclassiﬁcation has been difﬁcult to ex-
clude, and these can either deﬂate or inﬂate observed ef-
fects.
62,63 Measurement error has decreased over time for
many ﬁelds of research in the current era. For example,
genetic measurements have very minor measurement error if
measurement platforms are used properly. Conversely, for
some other variables, (eg, lifestyle), measurement error may
remain substantial. Even in molecular/genetic epidemiology,
misclassiﬁcation remains important for evaluating gene-en-
vironment interactions.
64–67 Of note, when effects diminish
because of misclassiﬁcation, power to detect them also di-
minishes sharply
68; this enhances the inﬂation upon discov-
ery (inﬂation of a deﬂated effect), as above.
Furthermore, vibration of effects with selective report-
ing and interpretation of effects may sometimes reﬂect re-
verse biases. Various conﬂicts of interest may work in the
direction of silencing or diminishing newly discovered asso-
ciations that don’t ﬁt ﬁnancial or other dogmatic perspectives.
For therapeutic research, although ﬁnancial conﬂicts may
lead to inﬂation of treatment effects for new interventions,
69
they may similarly lead to deﬂation of the magnitude of
adverse events.
70 For example, although most meta-analy-
ses
71,72 of rosiglitazone found ORs for myocardial infarction
in the range of 1.43, a meta-analysis originally conducted by
Glaxo found a more conservative OR and the company did
not consider it to be of concern.
73 However, the literature on
adverse events of interventions is small compared with the
literature on effectiveness.
74 Most harms probably remain
unknown rather than silenced.
75
Finally, conﬂicts may be of nonﬁnancial nature. Some
investigators may fervently support their line of research and
beliefs. For example, even the most strongly refuted associ-
ations continue to have supporters many years after the
refutation.
76 Investigators may suppress new ﬁndings when
they do not suit their beliefs.
What To Do
At the time of ﬁrst postulated discovery, we usually can
not tell whether an association exists at all,
1 let alone judge its
effect size. As a starting principle, one should be cautious
about effect sizes. Uncertainty is not conveyed simply by CIs
(no matter if these are 95%, 99%, or 99.9% CIs) (Table 3).
For a new proposed association, credibility and accu-
racy of its proposed effect varies depending on the case. One
may ask the following questions: does the research commu-
nity in this ﬁeld adopt widely statistical signiﬁcance or
similar selection thresholds for claiming research ﬁndings?
Did the discovery arise from a small study? Is there room for
large ﬂexibility in the analyses? Are we unprotected from
selective reporting (eg, was the protocol not fully available
upfront)? Are there people or organizations interested in
ﬁnding and promoting speciﬁc “positive” results? Finally, are
the counteracting forces that would deﬂate effects minimal?
Modeling or correcting some of the sources of inﬂation
is possible with (more) appropriate methods, such as for
genetic linkage or association
17,23 or for regression coefﬁ-
cients in general.
33,77 These methods are probably more
useful in estimating expected effect sizes, so as to perform
more proper power calculations for future replication efforts,
rather than for claiming that accurate “corrected” estimates of
effect are known. In each case, one has to ask whether it is
appropriate to ignore completely the effect size for a new
proposed association. It may be best to wait for additional,
larger studies and cumulative evidence to reach a more ﬁrm
conclusion on whether an effect exists at all, and then worry
about its size later. Most ﬁelds can wait for the conduct of
replication studies.
The conduct of larger studies in the discovery phase
will diminish inﬂation due to suboptimal power. However,
this is not always feasible. Discovery may sometimes arise
from small investigations or even unanticipated case obser-
vations.
70 However, even if many discoveries in the past
arose out of haphazard encounters of scientists with phenom-
ena, this does not mean that we cannot improve in the future
by running larger discovery-oriented studies. Agnostic ge-
nome-wide associations provide such an example.
78
Using a strict protocol for the design, conduct, and
analysis of a study can diminish vibration, but would this
stiﬂe creativity? Flexible analyses will not cause a problem if
TABLE 3. Avoiding Being Misled on Effect Sizes of True
Associations in Early Discovery
Be cautious about effect sizes (and even about the mere presence of any
effect in new discoveries)
Consider rational down-adjustment of effect sizes
Consider analytical methods that correct for anticipated inﬂation
Ignore effect sizes arising from discovery research
Conduct large studies in discovery phase
Use strict protocols for analyses
Adopt complete and transparent reporting of all results
Use methodologically rigorous, unbiased replication (potentially ad inﬁnitum)
Be fair with interpretation
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of all results. Despite demonstrable progress and the avail-
ability of evidence-based guidance for reporting, such as
CONSORT,
79,80 STROBE,
81 and STARD,
82 full reporting
remains an unattained target even in ﬁelds such as random-
ized trials, which are further ahead in registration and report-
ing efforts.
83,84 Making databases publicly available is more
easily said than done, and there are many challenges in
making this a widespread practice.
85,86 Still, the antithesis of
practices among various ﬁelds is striking. For example, ge-
nome-wide associations studies currently test hundreds of
thousands of associations, ask for very demanding thresholds
(eg, P  10
7), report all results in a single paper, and then
often make the data publicly available.
87,88 Conversely, in
traditional risk-factor epidemiology (eg, nutritional epidemi-
ology), each (or a few) of the thousands of tested associations
is reported as a single separate paper, “P  0.05” rules are
still widespread, and databases rarely become public. Imagine
what would happen if the criteria of genome-wide association
studies were applied to nutritional epidemiology associations.
There are clearly other major differences among such ﬁelds,
89
but one wonders whether such widely discrepant practices are
justiﬁed. Inclusive consortia of investigators may also help
enhance transparency and completeness of reporting of results.
90
Discovery can be unfettered, haphazard, exploratory,
opportunistic, selective, and highly subjectively interpreted.
Conversely, these same characteristics that are perfectly ﬁne
for discovery are not desirable of replication. Replication is
essential for all discoveries and with few exceptions (eg,
treatment effects in interventional studies) only resource
constrains and prioritization issues would prohibit replication
ad inﬁnitum. Replication offers a wider evidence base on
which to try to make inferences about the truth and biases that
may affect it.
A crucial question is whether replication sufﬁces to
correct the inﬂated effects that arise in early studies.
91,92 For
example, should a meta-analysis worry about including an
early terminated study? In principle, the replication process,
if unbiased, should correct the inﬂation
91 and if stopping is
not very early, inﬂation is small regardless.
93 However, the
replication process may not be unbiased, and may sometimes
suffer from similar problems as (or more problems than) the
discovery. Observational evidence has been attacked as un-
reliable, and even the best meta-analyses of observational
data meet with skepticism for their spurious precision.
94
Problems may arise, however, even for the supposedly more
rigorous design of randomized trials. To demonstrate this
problem, an evaluation of the whole Cochrane Library shows
1011 systematic reviews that have at least one meta-analysis
with at least 4 studies.
95 Selecting the largest meta-analysis in
each of these reviews, 256 of the 1011 meta-analyses have
formally statistically signiﬁcant results (P  0.05) by random
effects calculations in the OR scale. The effect sizes of these
“positive” meta-analyses are inversely related to the amount
of evidence accumulated (Fig. 2). Perhaps large anticipated
effects lead to the conduct of small trials and small antici-
pated effects promote several large trials. However, the ob-
served pattern is consistent with what one would expect based
on the inﬂation biases described above. Most meta-analyses
remain largely underpowered for small-to-modest effects.
96
Superimposed selective reporting can also be operating.
Thus, even in the theoretically most rigorous study design
(randomized trials), not only discoveries but also pragmati-
cally limited replication efforts may not eliminate inﬂation of
effects, and may not even ensure that any effect at all is
present.
What constitutes fair interpretation of new discoveries is
unavoidably subjective. However, critical discussion of limita-
tions, caveats, and a reserved stance against one’s ﬁndings is
useful. Thresholds of signiﬁcance that dictate a discovery may
have to be abolished. Instead, all results would be reported,
grading their credibility and the uncertainty thereof in a Bayes-
ian framework. Suggestions to adopt Bayesian views of research
results have long been made.
1,11,97–103 However, inﬂation of
effects may still be an issue, even if effects are selected based
on Bayes factor thresholds rather than P value thresholds.
This depends on how Bayes factors are calculated. For
example, direct translation
99 of P values (or z-scores) to
minimum Bayes factors, exp(z
2/2), would face the same
problem, whereas if priors assume that small effects are
FIGURE 2. Relationship between total sample size and the
effect size (odds ratio) for 256 Cochrane meta-analyses with
formally statistically significant results (P  0.05 according to
random effects calculations) and at least 4 included studies.
Both axes are in log10 scale. Also shown is a fit LOESS line. All
odds ratios have been coined to be 1.00 for consistency. The
median effect size for the 40 meta-analyses with at least
10,000 subjects is 1.53. Not shown are 5 outliers with extreme
sample size or effect size.
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become most promising for small effects.
103 Bayesian views
are useful when coupled with unselective presentation of all
results. In this way, one can see which results are more
interesting based on different prior assumptions, and whether
there is consistency in highlighting speciﬁc results. New
results modify future priors. If new results are biased because
of selection, priors get biased and we may keep pursuing,
believing, and expecting nonexistent large effects.
Finally, Table 4 summarizes 2 stances in hunting asso-
ciations—the aggressive discoverer versus the reﬂective rep-
licator. These stances may underlie the root of the problems
that I discussed here, and their possible solutions. In trying to
reward or punish scientists for their stance and in shaping the
new generation of scientists, we need to think hard about
which of the 2 modes we want to promote, and whether some
good elements can be picked from each list.
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